This Timeline identifies key inflection points and consequential events relevant to regulation, governance, and enforcement issues in college sports.

Section V (Critical Themes from the Timeline) discusses recurring issues, patterns, and narratives that challenge today’s decision and policy-makers.

1906 –  In response to an alarming number of football-related injuries and deaths, a group of universities forms the first national college athletic body under the name Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States

1910 – IAAUS changes name to National Collegiate Athletic Association

1906 to 1945 – NCAA is a flaccid “debating society” with no meaningful enforcement authority or jurisdiction; operates under “Home Rule” principles where institutions and conferences self-govern; amateurism principles are included in NCAA policy documents, yet are routinely violated; amateurism framed as a moral principle designed to align the values of college sports with the values of higher education

1929 – Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching publishes a report titled American College Athletics largely critical of college football and its impact on the values of higher education; the report chronicles the professionalization and commercialization of college football and indifference to amateurism principles; in his preface to the Report (“Athletics, and Element in the Evolution of the American University”), Foundation President Henry Pritchett introduces the concept of presidential control over college sports: “The responsibility to bring athletics into a sincere relation to the intellectual life of the college presidents rests squarely on the shoulders of the president and faculty.”

1945 to 1950 – Unregulated Post-WWII recruiting environment fueled by a glut of college-eligible veterans and the education benefits of the G.I Bill spurs discussions over the terms of financial aid for recruited athletes

1948 – NCAA proposes the “Sanity Code” financial aid award, which strikes a compromise between interests that want the full athletic scholarship and those that want aid tied to academic qualifications and financial need; to enforce the Sanity Code, the NCAA sets up its first enforcement structure, the Constitutional Compliance Committee

1950 – A group of seven schools advocating for the full athletic scholarship refuse to comply with the Sanity Code; the NCAA moves to expel the seven schools but fails to garner a two-thirds majority of members required for expulsion; the Sanity Code dies as a result

1951 – NCAA hires Walter Byers as its first full-time executive director; Byers would go on to serve in the position until 1987; Byers becomes the architect of the modern NCAA regulatory, governance, and enforcement model

1951 to 1952 – the NCAA enters the television era; Byers launches a campaign to have the NCAA monopolize televised football; Byers asks the membership to vote in support of NCAA control over televised football; at the January 1952 NCAA convention, the membership votes 163 – 8 in favor of NCAA control; the University of Pennsylvania and Notre Dame University aggressively oppose the NCAA monopoly because they have successful independent TV contracts; in the face of the membership vote, Penn and Notre Dame acquiesce to NCAA monopoly; Byer’s power play bolsters NCAA’s regulatory authority

1952 – Capitalizing on a Kentucky point-shaving and impermissible benefits scandal, Byers forms the NCAA Subcommittee on Infractions and opens the very first infractions/enforcement file he named “Case Report no. 1 September 20-21, 1952”;  Byers asks schools on Kentucky’s schedule to cancel games; in the face of the “inverse death penalty”, Kentucky agrees to a one-year ban; Byer’s acquisition of the televised football monopoly, combined with the Kentucky ban are major victories for the NCAA’s enforcement authority and jurisdiction; NCAA makes anti-gambling a centerpiece of its regulatory emphasis for the next 70 years

1952 – In response to perceived scandals, the American Council on Education expresses concern over the regulation of college sports and calls for university presidential oversight; ACE’s advocacy and criticism of college sports would influence the debate over the regulation of college sports into the 21st century

1950s –injured athletes claim they are university employees for purposes of state workers’ compensation laws; Byers and NCAA lawyers invent the term “student-athlete” to define the relationship between athletes and institutions emphasizing an educational relationship to avoid workers’ compensation liability; the use of term “student-athlete” becomes ubiquitous in America; NCAA claims “student-athlete” is the opposite of employee; in his 1995 expose, Byers discloses the truth of the origin of the phrase “student-athlete”

1956 – the NCAA adopts the full athletic scholarship it opposed in the Sanity Code debates; many view the new scholarship as outright pay-for-play; the full athletic scholarship fixes the cost of athlete labor; any payments above the scholarship are deemed violations of amateurism principles; with the adoption of the full athletic scholarship, amateurism transitions from a moral principle to a labor principle; in his 1995 expose on college sports titled Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Exploiting College Athletes, Walter Byers turns on the NCAA’s amateurism-based model characterizing amateurism as “camouflage for monopoly practice”

1972 to 1978 – passage of Title IX and phase-in period; the NCAA and big-time football interests seek to exclude football from Title IX coverage; Title IX viewed as existential regulatory and legal threat to status quo big-time football interests

1973 – NCAA restructures from a binary “university” and “college” structure to three divisions (Division I, Division II, and Division III); divisional structure places big-time sports schools in Division I; divisional distinctions based in large measure on size, financial resources, and athletic ambitions; each Division has its own legislative and policy-making processes subject to Association-wide rules and principles

1973 -  NCAA’s in-house enforcement staff takes control of infractions investigations and Committee on Infractions conducts hearings

1974 – under the auspices of ACE, George Hanford publishes a report outlining emerging issues and the alignment of college sports’ values with the values of higher education; Hanford recommends a Carnegie Report-like comprehensive review of college sports including the role of universities presidents and boards of trustees

1977 – a group of powerful football schools form the College Football Association to advocate for more control over the televised football market and against the NCAA football monopoly

1977 – UNLV basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian begins protracted litigation against the NCAA arising from an NCAA investigation into the UNLV basketball program; UNLV is a public institution; NCAA found that Tarkanian violated NCAA impermissible benefits rules and told UNLV it must disassociate from Tarkanian; NCAA penalties run through schools, not directly through individuals; UNLV chooses to fire Tarkanian; before penalty is enforced, Tarkanian files a lawsuit in Nevada state court claiming the NCAA’s investigation and penalties denied him federal due process protections

1978 – Division I further separates into I-A and I-AA; I-A comprised of big-time conferences and schools in big-time college football and men’s basketball; I-AA comprised of smaller and lower-resource schools; new subdivisions defined explicitly by football interests; in 2006, NCAA changes name of I-A to Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and I-AA to Football Championship Division (FCS)

1978 – in response to the Tarkanian suit, the NCAA infractions and enforcement process (and Walter Byers) come under increasing scrutiny for heavy-handed enforcement tactics; Congress holds ten days of hearings aimed at NCAA infractions and enforcement fairness issues; Byers testifies; no meaningful reform comes from the hearings; witnesses criticize NCAA enforcement tactics emphasizing the absurdity of NCAA principles of “cooperation” and “restitution” (see 2006 entry on Andy Oliver case); NCAA requires investigatory “cooperation” from those subject to its jurisdiction; refusal to “cooperate”—including silence—is an independent NCAA process crime; at the 1978 hearings, University of Denver law professor Burton Brody testified and identified fundamental flaws in the infractions process that exist today: (1) fundamental fairness: “I believe that the practices and procedures of the infractions committee are unfair, unjust, arbitrary, and heavy-handed. The enforcement program, as I have come to know it, is without simple decency and fundamental fairness.” (2) presumption of guilt: “...it is not a dispute resolution system. By the time the infractions committee begins an official inquiry, there is no dispute. The defendant [athlete, coach, school] is guilty, and the infractions inquisition merely calls upon the defendant to supply additional evidence of that guilt, supply evidence of other wrongdoing on its part, respectfully murmur mea culpas, and accept the penance meted out by the infractions committee in a cooperative spirit to achieve absolute association absolution.” (3) the illusion that infractions and enforcement cases are “cooperative”: “Its [the infractions process] most annoying flaw is its oft-described ‘cooperative nature.’ The NCAA’s enforcement program is cooperative only in the same sense ancient Rome’s system of capital punishment was cooperative—the condemned is expected to carry his cross to the crucifixion.” (4) the illusion that the peer review Committee on Infractions makes independent judgments: “A far more serious imperfection in the enforcement program results from the fact that the individuals nominally responsible for it—the members of the committee on infractions—can…devote only a small portion of their time and talents to infractions matters. Thus, it seems to me that judgments and decisions which seriously affect the lives of universities, educators, and students are, in practice, left to the [NCAA] enforcement staff…the enforcement staff controls the process because they do the work…the committee [on infractions] merely puts the academic community’s imprimatur on the enforcement staff’s conclusions.” (5) the illusion that those charged with violations get a fair hearing: “The hearing was a farce. It was, at best, a burlesque of fairness. No evidence was presented: only the conclusions of staff members. No witnesses were called. The only ‘testimony’ was by the enforcement staff member, without oath, stating the rankest sort of mixture of hearsay and opinion as part of his prosecution's arguments. And, of course, such a procedure does not contemplate anything approaching cross-examination.”

1979 – ESPN launches; ushers in the cable era in college sports expanding the reach of sports-specific broadcast media

1981 – the University of Oklahoma Board of Regents and the University Georgia Athletic Assn. file a federal antitrust suit against the NCAA to strike down the NCAA’s monopoly over televised football; the Oklahoma district court finds the NCAA acts as a classic monopoly with respect to its TV contracts and strikes down those contracts as a violation of free competition laws; decision gives big-time football its financial freedom from the NCAA; the case would come to be known as “Board of Regents”

1983 - the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals upholds the district court in a 2-1 decision; dissenting judge (Barrett) would have upheld the NCAA’s monopoly, saying, “I firmly believe that to the extent that the NCAA’s television restraints upon Oklahoma and Georgia and other member institutions with excellent football programs are anti-competitive, those restraints are fully justified under the rule of reason [antitrust analysis] in that they are necessary to maintain intercollegiate football as amateur competition.”

1984 (June) – in a 7-2 opinion, the US Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts and rules the NCAA’s television contracts violate antitrust laws; decision fundamentally changes financial markets in college and leaves the future of college football to the free markets; Justice Byron White—a college and professional football star—adopts Judge Barrett’s 10th Circuit dissent and argues that noncommercial justifications, maninly preserving “amaterusim", place the NCAA beyond the reach of antitrust laws; decision would influence aggressive professionalization of college football and men’s basketball and influence a “trickle down” professionalization effect for nonrevenue and women’s sports; decision has two crucial regulatory effects (1) it shifts the balance of power in favor of big-time football schools and conferences and away from the NCAA and Byers, and (2) as a result of some off-hand comments (“dicta”) in the majority opinion on the importance of amateurism, external regulators such as federal courts, Congress, state legislatures, and administrative agencies are extraordinarily deferential to the NCAA’s regulatory authority and its amateurism-based regulatory model; Board of Regents also results in the NCAA’s aggressive marketing of the Division I men’s basketball tournament (“March Madness”) to replace football revenue; men’s basketball becomes the NCAA’s sole source of meaningful revenue; through long-term contracts with CBS and later Turner that now extend into 2032, NCAA revenues soars to over $1 billion per year and guarantee the perpetuation of the NCAA administrative state

1985 – through the American Council on Education, university presidents seek influence over NCAA policymaking to align the regulation of college sports with the values of higher education; presidents are concerned that boards of trustees, alumni, athletics directors, coaches, and conference commissioners wield too much power; the NCAA creates the Presidents Commission; Commission unsuccessfully sought the authority to veto or modify NCAA rules; the Commission receives substantial pushback from status quo decision-makers (e.g., conference commissioners, athletic directors, and coaches) and fails to achieve meaningful reform

1987 - news breaks that three athlete agents, Norby Walters, Lloyd Bloom, and Jim Abernethy paid approximately fifty college athletes hundreds of thousands of dollars (combined) in cash and other in-kind benefits (clothing, hotel, travel, etc.) to sign agent contracts before their college eligibility expired; Walters and Bloom, who worked together through an agency in New York, signed many high-profile athletes—mainly football and men’s basketball players—who would play professionally; Walters and Bloom became symbols for “bad actor” agents and faced federal and state prosecutions; fallout from the scandal was widespread, resulting in many athletes losing their eligibility and institutional forfeiture of NCAA post-season revenues; in response to the scandal, states began augmenting existing athlete agent laws or passing new ones with stringent requirements and penalties; laws explicitly built around the preservation of the “integrity” of college sports and NCAA principles of amateurism; many laws included criminal penalties for athletes; scandal fuels external NCAA-friendly regulation by states, the Uniform Law Commission (see 2000 entry), and Congress (see 2004 entry on Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act); similar “bad actor” themes deferring to NCAA values will be incorporated into state name, image, and likeness laws and proposed federal legislation

1988  - in NCAA v Tarkanian, US Supreme Court rules in a 5-4 decision that the NCAA was not engaged in “state action” by compelling UNLV (a state university) to impose penalties on Tarkanian; therefore, federal due process requirements do not apply to the NCAA; Tarkanian ruling is major victory for NCAA and immunizes it from constitutional scrutiny; decision fuels NCAA indifference to process rights of those subject to NCAA enforcement jurisdiction; former Solicitor General Rex Lee argues case for NCAA; Lee would later chair the NCAA Special Committee to Review the NCAA Enforcement and Infractions Process (see 1991 entry)

1989 – the Knight Foundation forms the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics; Commission is tasked to make recommendations on regulation and oversight of college sports to align with the values of higher education; Knight Commission channels the work of the Carnegie Report (1929) and the Presidents Commission (1985)

1990s to present - exploding revenues post-Board of Regents leads to arms race in recruiting, facilities, and coaching salaries; effect of multi-prong arms race is a corresponding explosion in trivial NCAA amateurism-based “extra benefits” and recruiting rules; NCAA Division I Manual exceeds 450 pages of incomprehensible rules; big-time athletics departments begin hiring “compliance officers”—many with law degrees—to manage the expansive web of rules

1991 – the Knight Commission releases its first substantive report, “Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete,” which is critical of college sports regulation; the Commission’s recommendations are built around the central tenet of presidential control of college athletics

1991 -NCAA releases the report of its Special Committee to Review the NCAA Enforcement and Infractions Process; committee chaired by former Solicitor General Rex Lee who represented the NCAA in Tarkanian; report acknowledged concerns that the NCAA enforcement process lacked transparency, independence, accountability, consistency, efficiency, and fairness; report recommended that an independent hearing officer—not the NCAA Committee on Infractions— would act as fact-finder and impose penalties; purpose of independent hearing officer was to prevent the NCAA COI from simultaneously acting as “prosecutor and judge”; committee also recommended that enforcement hearings be open to the public to promote transparency and accountability; the NCAA rejected both of these recommendations; NCAA adopts some recommendations (notice of allegations requirement, summary disposition procedure, appellate body, public reporting of decisions, and adoption of a conflict-of-interest policy), but critics contend these changes fall short of meaningful protections

1993- several states (ex., Nevada, Florida) pass laws providing due process rights in NCAA enforcement actions that would place new obligations on the NCAA; NCAA successfully nullifies the Nevada law in a federal lawsuit—Miller v NCAA—under a dormant commerce clause theory

1995 – former and longest serving (1951-1987) NCAA president Walter Byers publishes Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Exploiting College Athletes; book is an expose on NCAA hypocrisy and false values; Byers—who was the architect of the modern NCAA regulatory and business model—turns on the very principles he built; Byers explains the true history of the term “student-athlete” which was manufactured by Byers and NCAA lawyers to avoid workers’ compensation liability; Byers also exposes the concept of amateurism as a labor principle, not a moral principle saying, “Collegiate amateurism is not a moral issue; it is an economic camouflage for monopoly practice.”

Byers, W., & Hammer, C. (1995, October 3). Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Exploiting College Athletes, p. 376.

1996 – NCAA eliminates one-school-one-vote legislation process in favor of a federated system based on conference representation dominated by university presidents and chancellors; principle of institutional control through presidential leadership formalized

1997 to 2014 – rulemaking and policymaking in Division I has various iterations including D-I Management Council, D-I Board of Directors, and Legislative Council; the Management and Legislative Council’s authorities were diluted by weighted voting provisions on football issues that gave the FBS conferences more voting power than FCS and non-football conferences combined; weighted voting guaranteed that big-time football interests could not be threatened by other Division I subgroups; through this time frame, the first wave of football-driven conference realignment results in the creation of the “Power 5 “ conferences (ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-12, and SEC

1999 – in NCAA v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court holds that the NCAA cannot be held responsible under Title IX because it does receive federal funding; Smith case reinforces the NCAA firewall from legal responsibility for the gender equity values it champions in its Constitution and public relations campaigns; the 2021 Kaplan Report on Gender Equity arising from the substandard facilities for women vs men in the 2021 basketball tournaments highlights the NCAA’s historical resistance to gender equity and Title IX

2000 – the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) adopts the Uniform Athlete Agent Act (UAAA); ULC is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, private commission comprised of approximately 300 lawyers, law professors, judges, and legislators; the ULC “promote[s] the principle of [state legislative] uniformity by drafting and proposing specific [state] statutes in areas where uniformity between states is desirable.”; the ULC can only propose state legislation, state legislatures must adopt proposed laws through the legislative process; the UAAA (and subsequent Revised Uniform Athlete Agent Act of 2015) aligns with the NCAA’s conceptualization of amateurism and is fully supported by the NCAA; the NCAA has no direct regulatory authority over athlete agents (or boosters, collectives, and other third-party market actors); the NCAA has used external regulators (e.g., ULC, state legislatures and Congress) to impose amateurism-based market restrictions on athletes and institutions (see 2004 Entry below on the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act)

Note: For a more detailed discussion of the role of state legislatures in the regulation of college sports, see the “State Legislatures” Tab in the Explore Menu.

2001 – Indiana University President Myles Brand delivers speech to National Press Club after he fired IU basketball coach Bob Knight; Brand emphasizes the need for NCAA reform designed to align big-time college sports with the values of higher education; Brand advocates having less money in the college sports marketplace, not more

2003 – NCAA hires Myles Brand as NCAA President; marks an important shift in NCAA leadership away from former athletic administrators; academic community applauds the hire

2004 - Colorado state court issues opinion in suit by Olympic skier and University of Colorado football player Jeremy Bloom denying his challenge to the NCAA’s determination that Bloom was ineligible to play football because he had accepted endorsement money for his skiing notoriety; the NCAA’s threshold defense was that Bloom had no standing as an athlete to challenge the NCAA’s eligibility decision because athletes are not members of the NCAA; any challenge would have to be made by an athlete’s university or college; Bloom argued that he was a third-party beneficiary of NCAA rules and could challenge the "contract" (agreed-upon rules) between the NCAA and its member institutions; a Colorado appeals court agreed with Bloom’s standing argument and allowed the case to go forward, ruling that Bloom had standing to allege that the NCAA had violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in all contracts in its application of NCAA rules to him; the court ultimately ruled against Bloom on the merits of the eligibility determination, deferring to the NCAA's role as a voluntary association and the amateurism-based dicta from Board of Regents; Bloom case highlights the absence of NCAA accountability to athletes despite its claims to serve athlete interests, but does provide a pathway for athletes to challenge NCAA rules interpretations

2004 – House Judiciary Committee holds a hearing titled “Due Process and the NCAA”; hearing motivated by an NCAA ruling making Olympic skier Jeremy Bloom ineligible to play football for the University of Colorado because he received endorsement money for his skiing success; two witnesses channel Rex Lee report and call for independent infractions adjudicators and infractions hearings open to the public; hearing does not yield reform

2004 – Congress passes the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA) to regulate athlete agents; SPARTA is modeled after the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Athlete Agent Act; SPARTA does not preempt state athlete agent laws, but complements them through a dual federal-state regulatory model; SPARTA grants the Federal Trade Commission regulatory authority to enforce the Act; SPARTA explicitly adopts the NCAA’s conceptualization of amateurism; in its “Sense of Congress” provision, SPARTA says, “It is the sense of Congress that States should enact the Uniform Athlete Agents Act of 2000 drafted by the [ULC] to protect student-athletes and the integrity of amateur sports from unscrupulous sports agents. In particular, it is the sense of Congress that States should enact the provisions relating to the registration of sports agents, the required form of contract, the right of the student-athlete to cancel the agency contract, the disclosure requirements relating to record maintenance, reporting, renewal, notice, warning, and security, and the provisions for reciprocity among the States.” (emphasis added); SPARTA gives institutions but not athletes a private right of action against agents who violate the law; in 2002 Congress conducted hearings on SPARTA; Howard Beales, then Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer protection testified against SPARTA; Beales raised a number of objections, including (1) athlete agent issues were not on a scale that would justify FTC oversight, (2) the Federal Trade Commission Act already covers deceptive trade practices, which renders SPARTA duplicative and unnecessary, (3) Congress should not adopt as law or policy NCAA rules and values to protect the college sports industries private commercial interests, saying “although many industry self-regulatory programs provide significant and desirable protection for consumers, it is important to consider whether particular restraints may function to protect the industry rather than consumers… the public debate surrounding NCAA eligibility rules underscores the need for the careful examination of the effects of underlying private restraints before enacting legislation that supports them.”; Beales testified that rather than invoke the FTC’s authority, it would be more effective to give institutions and athletes a private right of action against agents; Beales ultimately opposed SPARTA; to date, there is no record that the FTC has pursued a single case against an athlete agent under SPARTA

2006 (January 6-9) – at the 2006 centennial NCAA convention, Myles Brand unveils the “Collegiate Model” of college athletics; model includes a financial framework for college sports that mandates maximization of revenues in big-time football and men’s basketball; Brand argues that revenue maximization is appropriate on the “input” side so long as that revenue is spent on the “output” side in a way that is consistent with a university’s nonprofit purpose; Brand identified “participation opportunities” for sports and athletes that could not pay for themselves as the “output side” justification consistent with the values of higher education; many view Brand’s Collegiate Model as a cynical rationalization for conducting professional sports under the auspices of higher education and fundamentally inconsistent with his prior claims that there should be less money in the system; Brand captures the fundamental hypocrisy in college sports saying “Amateur defines the participants, not the enterprise.”

2006 – a group of athletes file a federal class action antitrust suit—White v NCAA—claiming the athletic scholarship limit set below the full cost of attendance violates antitrust laws; White is an important inflection point that marks the first wave of antitrust suits by athletes directly challenging NCAA amateurism-based compensation limits; NCAA takes the position that adding the full cost of attendance stipend to the athletic scholarship would be outright pay-for-play and transform athletes from amateurs to professionals; White ultimately settles without changing the scholarship limit, but changes the regulatory environment because the suit acted as an external regulatory influence that sought to force the NCAA to change

2006 – baseball player Andy Oliver is declared ineligible by the NCAA because he had preliminary negotiations with a professional baseball team that did not lead to a signed contract; ineligibility ruling was made before Oliver had an opportunity to present his case to the NCAA; Oliver sued the NCAA seeking a temporary injunction that would allow him to play pending the NCAA’s investigation; in response to Oliver’s claims, the NCAA claimed (1) he had no standing to sue because NCAA athletes are not members of the NCAA and cannot directly challenge an NCAA rule interpretation or eligibility determination, and (2) the NCAA’s “Restitution Rule” permitted the NCAA to severely punish schools who allowed an athlete to play pending a resolution of a court challenge to an NCAA eligibility determination if the NCAA ultimately won in court; penalties included  forfeiture of all revenues a school received while the athlete was permitted to play; the Restitution Rule incentivized schools to immediately declare an athlete ineligible and discouraged athletes from pursuing litigation; Oliver challenged the restitution rule in court; the presiding judge ruled in favor of Oliver and rebuked the Restitution Rule as an affront to basic principles of due process and access to the courts; the NCAA settled the case and avoided a legal ruling that declared the Restitution Rule unconstitutional; the Restitution Rule remains in the NCAA rulebook today

2006 (October/November) - House Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill Thomas (R-CA) sends letter to Myles Brand challenging the NCAA’s nonprofit status with respect to its men’s basketball and football products; Thomas points to NCAA’s multi-billion contract with CBS for television rights to the Division I men’s basketball tournament as primary point of emphasis and suggests the NCAA should at least be subject to the Unrelated Business Income Tax requirements for nonprofits; Brand responds by channeling his articulation of the “collegiate model” in January arguing that the claimed educational features of college sports are indistinguishable from the educational mission of higher education

2009 – a group of athletes files a federal class action suit—O’Bannon v NCAA—challenging the NCAA’s amateurism-based compensation limits on name, image, and likeness (NIL); NCAA aggressively defends the suit under principles of amateurism; case goes through full bench trial; district court finds NIL compensation limits violate antitrust laws and offers NIL trust funds and the full cost of attendance scholarships as remedies; on appeal, the 9th Circuit strikes down trust funds as inconsistent with the NCAA’s conceptualization of amateurism but permits the full cost of attendance scholarship; 9th Circuit decision is very favorable for the NCAA because it prevents an open market for the value athletes’ services and defers in large measure to amateurism; 9th Circuit draws distinction between education-related benefits (permissible) and non-education benefits (impermissible); Judge Sidney Thomas files dissenting opinion arguing that the majority improperly used amateurism as a free-floating value in a way that had nothing to do with antitrust laws; US Supreme Court declines to hear case; O’Bannon is significant because it increased pressure on NCAA from external regulators

2010 – after Myles Brand’s death in 2009, the NCAA hires former university president Mark Emmert as NCAA President; Emmert’s twelve-year tenure is defined by controversy and criticism

2010 – academic and impermissible benefits allegations surface at UNC; allegations evolve to expose fake courses in the African and Afro-American Studies department; athletes and non-athletes receive academic credit for which little or no work product existed; allegations also involve claims of inappropriate assistance from academic tutors

2010 – five Ohio State football players, including star quarterback Terrelle Pryor are accused of selling personal sports memorabilia in exchange for cash and tattoos; case comes to be known as “Tattoogate”; NCAA suspends athletes for five games and issues punishments to Ohio State including striking Ohio State wins from the official record; Pryor and teammates publicly apologize; head football coach Jim Tressell resigns after emails surface that suggest he knew about the players receipt of impermissible benefits under NCAA rules; Ohio State sends “disassociation” letter to Pryor limiting Pryor’s engagement with the University; Pryor’s sale of his personal memorabilia would be fine today under the NCAA’s 2021 Interim NIL Policy; two weeks after the announcement of Interim Policy, the Ohio State players sought to have their team records reinstated; the NCAA denied the request; a similar situation with former USC Heisman Trophy winner Reggie Bush (2005); after the 2006 season allegations surfaced that Bush and his family had received $100,000 in impermissible benefits while Bush was at USC; benefits would likely be permissible today if couched as NIL; in 2010, NCAA handed down harsh penalties; Bush returned his Heisman Trophy to the Heisman Trust; USC disassociated from Bush for ten years; after the Interim Policy went into effect in 2021, Bush sought return of the Heisman and restoration of his records; NCAA refused to alter the official record and the Heisman Trust did not return the Trophy to Bush; Bush recently sued the NCAA for defamation arising from public comments the NCAA made in 2021

2011 – NCAA initiates investigation into Miami (FL) recruiting violations arising from influence of Miami booster Nevin Shapiro

2011 (November) – Penn State assistant football coach Jerry Sandusky arrested on multiple counts of sexual abuse of eight boys; Penn State administrators, including President Graham Spanier charged with associated cover-up crimes; head coach Joe Paterno fired; Penn State trustees hire former FBI Director Louis Freeh to conduct investigation

2012 (July 12) – Freeh Report released; finds major lapses by Penn State administration in response to Sandusky allegations

2012 (July 23) – based on Freeh Report, NCAA announces sanctions through a “Consent Decree” against Penn State, including vacating wins (1998-2011), a $60 million penalty, and a four-year post-season ban; case does not go through NCAA infractions and enforcement process; NCAA President Mark Emmert and Division I Board rely exclusively on Freeh Report because no NCAA rules address the conduct at issue

2012 – after decades of opposition to an FBS football playoff, Power 5 conferences and Notre Dame create the College Football Playoff between the top four teams in the FBS; CFP signs multi-billion-dollar contract with ESPN; all CFP money stays with FBS football interests; none shared with the NCAA; CFP operates completely outside the control of the NCAA or any other regulatory body; it is set up as a limited liability company rather than an education nonprofit and financial information is not open to the public; CFP is governed by an eleven-member Board of Managers comprised of university presidents and chancellors from the ten FBS football conferences (Power 5 and Group of 5) plus Notre Dame. The Board of Managers has “authority over all aspects of the company’s operations”; CFP also has a Management Committee composed of FBS conference commissioners plus Notre Dame’s athletics director.

2013 – in response to external pressures including the O’Bannon name, image, and likeness suit and public perceptions that athletes—particularly big-time football and men’s basketball players—were being treated unfairly, the Power 5 conferences begin a campaign to further segregate their interests from the rest of the NCAA and enhance their legislative authority

2013 (January) – story breaks in Miami infractions case that NCAA enforcement staff entered into agreement with Miami booster’s bankruptcy attorney to use bankruptcy proceedings to gather evidence through subpoenas and depositions on behalf of NCAA enforcement staff; case becomes national scandal; NCAA suspends its Miami investigation to conduct internal NCAA investigation; NCAA hires outside law firm to conduct investigation; the firm conducts an investigation and writes a 42 page report in just 26 days; report largely exonerates NCAA, Mark Emmert, and NCAA enforcement and legal staffs; NCAA fires VP of Enforcement and claims not to use information gained in the bankruptcy case in its Miami infractions case

2013 (January) – Pennsylvania state senator Jake Corman files lawsuit against the NCAA challenging the NCAA’s imposition of penalties arising from the Sandusky case; documents obtained in discovery show that NCAA President Mark Emmert and the NCAA worked closely with Louis Freeh; documents show that Emmert knew the NCAA had no rules-based jurisdiction to punish Penn State and that Emmert was motivated to go outside the NCAA infractions and enforcement process to enhance his and the NCAA’s public reputation (see 2018 Penn State entry below)

2013 (January) – Division I Board of Directors retains outside consultant to assess the state of Division I governance; consultant discloses that Power 5 interests threatened to leave the NCAA to form their own association unless they are given preferential treatment in the legislative process

2013 (November) – Nebraska Chancellor Harvey Perlman and University of Florida President Bernie Machen author a memo to the Division I Board of Directors making the case for an “Autonomy” classification for the Power 5 under the NCAA umbrella; the memo cites the Power 5’s unique interests as financial drivers of the college sports marketplace; the Autonomy classification would give the Power 5 the ability to legislate independently of the rest of the membership in certain defined areas; memo makes clear that Power 5 won’t interfere with the NCAA’s March Madness gravy train (“The current rules regarding access to NCAA Basketball Championships and the distribution of NCAA revenue would be maintained. We seek control of our own destiny with the least disruption to the expectations of others.”); memo seeks to shift decision-making and control from presidents to athletics administrators (“There is considerable interest in developing a process that is simplified and is managed by athletics directors and faculty athletic representatives, and others who best understand the realities of competition at the highest level. Presidential control would remain a feature of such a process.”); memo also seeks an entirely separate infraction and enforcement apparatus controlled by the Power 5 and applicable only to the Power 5 (“We also believe our institutions have a more significant stake in the enforcement process. Unfortunately, but understandably, our members are often the targets for enforcement, are the most visible when violations occur, and have the most to lose if violations are found. We have the strongest stake in fashioning an enforcement mechanism that is and is perceived to be fair and even-handed. There are other models for enforcing regulatory regimes that should be examined. We need to empanel expertise from outside the NCAA to help us fashion a modern enforcement process, and we want the authority to adopt it for enforcement of rules against our institutions. Again, if this process were found appropriate by other institutions, it could be adopted across the NCAA.”)

2013 (November) – Rep. Tony Cardenas (D-CA) introduces “Collegiate Student Athlete Protection Act” designed to provide health and safety benefits and due process rights; bill does not make it out of committee

2013 – NCAA adopts a punishment structure that mimics federal criminal sentencing guidelines through the use of set penalties and “mitigating” and “aggravating” factors; more rigid structure further criminalizes NCAA infractions and enforcement process; process has many components of criminal prosecution including (1) the Notice of Allegations which serves as the NCAA’s “indictment” (2) use of confidential sources (for investigative work, not hearings), (3) grants of immunity to cooperating witnesses, and (4) inflexible “sentencing” criteria and set penalties (e.g. athlete ineligibility, post-season bans, scholarship reductions, financial penalties, and “show cause” orders for coaches and athletic administrators); a primary mitigating circumstance is institutional “cooperation” and “acceptance of responsibility” through self-imposed penalties often including immediate ineligibility of athletes before they have a chance to defend themselves; institutions are incentivized to publicly bow to NCAA authority based on allegations alone; criminalization of NCAA rules violations combined with coordinated media publicity portray athletes and coaches who are accused of NCAA violations as criminals; the legacy of athletes like the Ohio State football players in “Tattoogate”and Reggie Bush are tarnished and defined by their “crimes” against amateurism (see entries for 2010 and 2021 on Ohio State and Bush)

2014 – Northwestern football players file action with the National Labor Relations Board to form a union; to be covered under the National Labor Relations Act, athletes must first prove they are employees; applying a common law test for employee status, the NLRB regional director finds that football players are employees; on appeal, the National Board declines to assert jurisdiction but does not disturb the factual findings that the athletes are employees; Northwestern adds a new external regulatory threat—federal administrative agencies—to the NCAA and goes to the heart of the NCAA’s “student-athlete” label

2014 – NCAA and several professional sports leagues sue the state of New Jersey under a federal anti-gambling law—the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA)—to prevent New Jersey from legalizing sports betting; PASPA prohibits betting on amateur and professional team sports and gives private parties the right to sue; NCAA successfully obtains a preliminary injunction; the court requires the NCAA and pro leagues to post a bond to cover any damages to New Jersey if the injunction is dissolved; New Jersey claims PASPA is unconstitutional because it “commandeers’ the state’s legislative process in violation of the US Constitution’s 10th Amendment; case comes to be known as Murphy v NCAA; the NCAA uses Murphy to publicly posture on the evils of sports gambling

2014 (July) – the Power 5 dispatchNCAA President Mark Emmert to a hearing in the Senate Commerce Committee to make the Power 5’s case for Autonomy legislation; no Power 5 university presidents or conference commissioners appeared to testify; Committee Chair Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) aggressively questions Emmert on several issues and addresses the post-Board of Regents regulatory dysfunction between the NCAA and Power 5 (“I think the system is rigged so that you [the NCAA] are separated from the possibilities of getting something done. I don’t think you have the power, and I think it’s structured for that purpose.”); Senator Claire McCaskill makes perhaps one of the most important observations ever on the corrupt regulatory relationship between the Power 5 and the NCAA (“I feel for you because part of me thinks you’re captured by those that you’re supposed to regulate [the Power 5]. But then you’re supposed to regulate those that you’re captured by. And I can’t tell whether you’re in charge or whether you’re a minion to them. I don’t sense that you feel like you have any control of the situation. And if you’re merely a monetary pass-through, why should you even exist?”). Civil Rights historian Taylor Branch testified at the hearing and challenged the assumption that granting the Power 5 special regulatory status would benefit athletes (“...the least hopeful thing I heard today is that we are looking to these same 65 schools [the Power 5] that are the most commercialized as the engine of reform…[t]hey may give higher compensation, they may give more tips, but they are the ones that created most of the problems in the first place…[a]nd I don’t think that the big schools are gonna do anything other than be more driven by the market in athletics. And quite frankly, those schools exploit their athletes both as players and as students…but I don’t see the 65 schools as an engine for much reform in the future because their record doesn’t show that.”)

2014 (April) – through various Division I working groups and committees, the D-I Board of Directors seeks to implement Autonomy and overhaul the entire D-I governance process

2014 (August) – the D-I Board of Directors adopts Autonomy classification and substantially restructures D-I governance; the D-I Board of Directors expands to 24 members and includes several non-president members (“student-athlete,” athletics director, faculty athletics representative and “senior women’s athletic administrator”); D-I Board’s functions are more policy-oriented than legislative; D-I’s legislative arm runs through a new 40-member Division I Council comprised of representatives from each Division I conference; a minimum of sixty percent of the Council required to be conference commissioners, athletics directors, senior women administrators, and faculty athletics representatives; Council becomes primary legislative body but its authority is limited by weighted voting on football issues that favor FBS interests; Power 5 get nearly everything they want and have essentially an association within an association; notably, the Power 5 do not get an independent infractions and enforcement process

2014 – a group of athletes file a class action federal antitrust suit—Alston v NCAA (f/k/a Jenkins v NCAA)—challenging all NCAA amateurism-based compensation limits; Alston would result in an open and free market for the full value of athletes’ services; however, the case is filed in the same federal circuit as O’Bannon and must adhere to the O’Bannon education-non-education benefits distinction

2015 – NCAA sends Notice of Allegations to UNC in academic scandal

2015 – in McCants v NCAA, former UNC students file suit in federal court in North Carolina against the NCAA and UNC, claiming they were steered to fraudulent courses while students; the suit alleges, in part, that the NCAA breached its fiduciary duty to athletes to prevent the academic fraud and protect athletes; the athletes’ 100 page complaint cites from the NCAA Constitution, Bylaws, NCAA publications, and public rhetoric on athlete well-being and sound education standards as evidence of a legal duty; NCAA denies that it owes any duty to student-athletes, fiduciary or otherwise; NCAA says that descriptions of the NCAA’s purpose and mission are nothing more than “vague” and “hortatory” proclamations that have no legal consequence; district court dismisses claims against NCAA; NCAA’s “no duty” arguments in McCants are an open admission that it does not stand behind the principles it claims to hold

2016 – NCAA launches investigation into Baylor University football program and allegations of sexual assault and violence against women by Baylor football players; allegations include a cover-up by Baylor athletics department and university personnel

2017 (September 26) – prosecutors in the Southern District of New York announce criminal wire fraud and conspiracy charges against men’s college basketball assistant coaches, shoe company representatives (adidas), athlete agents, and athlete financial advisors; charges stem from an FBI sting operation in which defendants paid athletes families to attend an adidas-affiliated university or to sign with an athlete agent/financial advisor; acting US Attorney Kim Joon holds a 27-minute press conference announcing the charges

2017 (October) – NCAA forms the Commission on College Basketball (CCB) to address claimed corruption in men’s college basketball; Commission chaired by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

2017 (October) – in the UNC academic scandal case, the NCAA announces it is not pursuing NCAA violations because NCAA rules do not address the conduct at issue, and the academic fraud was not limited to athletes

2018 – in the Gatto criminal case arising from the basketball scandal, SDNY district court judge Lewis Kaplan articulates the “Victim University” theory of criminal liability claiming that the involved universities were victimized because they (1) awarded scholarship money to athletes that were ineligible because they received money in violation of NCAA amateurism rules, (2) were subjected to an increased likelihood of NCAA penalties, and (3) relied on false attestations by athletes and their parents that they had not compromised their amateur status prior to enrolling in college; at “the root” of Judge Kaplan’s theory was the NCAA’s principle of amateurism; ultimately, the defendants were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy charges and sentenced to jail and/or probation

2018 – in Murphy v NCAA, the US Supreme Court strikes down PASPA as unconstitutional under the 10th Amendment; New Jersey is permitted to go forward with sports betting; preliminary injunction is dissolved; New Jersey claims it suffered monetary damages while the preliminary junction in place that far exceed the bond posted by the NCAA; NCAA is subjected to substantial monetary damages

2018 – soon after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Murphy, the NCAA quietly enters into a ten-year contract with Genius Sports; Genius is a data collection company in the sports gambling industry that collects data—including data on athletes—and sells it to sports books and casinos at a substantial profit; the NCAA’s deal with Genius is in direct conflict with the NCAA’s decades-long anti-gambling rhetoric and its rules and policies that prohibit providing information to gambling interests or having any association with any person or entity in the gambling industry; the NCAA’s deal with Genius clearly violates the spirit if not the letter of the NCAA’s anti-gambling legislation and policies; the NCAA’s deal with Genius is rarely mentioned; at the beginning of March Madness in 2022, the CEO of Genius Sports wrote an op-ed explaining the purpose of Genius’s deal with the NCAA, saying “[b]ack when I was running Turner, we were able to convince the Time Warner Board to do a long-term deal with the NCAA Tournament because we recognized and understood that everyone fills out brackets, and that was never going to change. This creates a unique level of fan engagement. If you fill out a bracket, you’re going to watch. In a similar fashion, Genius also understood that filling out brackets creates office pools and game-by-game betting, which is central to our business model. Based on that, we constructed a 10-year relationship with the NCAA.”

2018 (April) – the CCB releases its report; among its recommendations, the CCB directed the NCAA to create a truly independent infractions and enforcement process for “high stakes” cases; channeling the Rex Lee Report from 1991, the CCB noted the obvious and long-standing defects and built-in conflicts of interests in the peer review process and the need for a truly independent investigative and adjudication process; CCB suggests that an established arbitration body would be ideal

2018 (August) – in response to the CCB’s recommendations, the NCAA creates the Independent Accountability Resolution Process (IARP); rather than use outside, independent arbitrators, the NCAA creates an entirely new bureaucracy controlled by NCAA committees and Boards; IARP is the first “independent” infractions and enforcement body in NCAA history; IARP authorities include controversial “importation” provision that allows NCAA to take information from other proceedings for use in NCAA infractions cases; critics cite due process concerns from importation almost immediately after the IARP becomes operational in August 2019, NCAA decision-makers and Power 5 conference leaders openly criticize the IARP as slow and inefficient; SEC Commissioner Greg Sankey is vocal opponent of IARP; ultimately, only six cases (all basketball-related) are referred to the IARP; in August 2022, NCAA Division I Board of Directors eliminates the IARP (see entry for August 2022), but retains the importation provision

2018 (August) – in response to allegations that Michigan State covered up sex crimes by convicted sex offender and athletics physician Larry Nassar, the NCAA infractions and enforcement staff announce they are not pursuing a case against Michigan State; in a letter to Michigan State, NCAA enforcement official says “the institution’s handling of student conduct allegations involving football and men’s basketball student-athlete [victims]…has not substantiated violations of NCAA legislation…it does not appear there is need for further investigation.”; decision highlights the gap between the NCAA’s public rhetoric on athlete health and safety and the reality that no existing NCAA legislation addresses conduct like that which occurred at Michigan State

2018 – group of Penn State trustees release a report on the Sandusky scandal titled “Report to the Board of Trustees of the Pennsylvania State University on the Freeh Report’s Methodology & Conclusion”; Section G.3. (“NCAA conflict of interest: ‘Image Conscious’”) says “[d]ocuments released from the discovery process in the Corman lawsuit against the NCAA revealed that NCAA officials believed that the organization had no jurisdiction over the Penn State-Sandusky matter, but that they were motivated to sanction Penn State in order to enhance the NCAA’s reputation.” (emphasis added); Corman documents and quotes from NCAA infractions insiders establish Emmert’s obsession with his and the NCAA’s public perception

2019 (February) – the California legislature begins consideration of a state name, image, and likeness bill that would permit NIL compensation in contravention of NCAA amateurism-based compensation limits; bill SB 206 comes to be known as the “Fair Pay to Play Act”; SB 206 seen as a response to limited NIL remedies in O’Bannon; NCAA threatens California with a lawsuit under a Dormant Commerce Clause theory to derail SB 206; SB 206 has an effective date of 2023 making it a remote threat

2019 – (March) – just prior to the sentencing phase of the Gatto criminal case in the Southern District of New York arising from the basketball “scandal,” (see 2018 entry above re the Gatto case) the NCAA files a Motion to Intervene in the case for the sole purpose of having access to documents and materials that had been excluded from evidence at trial; many materials were the product of wiretapped phone calls, and texts and emails obtained through FBI search warrants; the communications contained hearsay, rumor, speculation, and other scandalous claims; the NCAA intended to use the materials in its infractions and enforcement cases against schools and individuals implicated in the prosecution(s) through the use of its new “importation” powers (see August 2018 entry above on IARP and “importation”); the government opposed the NCAA’s motion; the district court judge issued his opinion on September 3rd, 2019 denying the NCAA’s motion; in weighing the balance between disclosure in the public interest and the potential harm to the individuals participating in or mentioned in the communications, the district court said that the information the NCAA sought might be viewed “by certain segments of the public as scandalous. Disclosure carries the risk of significant reputational and professional repercussions for those referenced in the documents.” (emphasis added); the court also agreed with the government “…that the information in these documents consists of hearsay, speculation and rumor. Furthermore, the individuals referred to in these documents are not standing trial. They will not have the opportunity to test the reliability of the information contained in these materials nor respond adequately to any inferences that might be drawn on the basis of this information. In other words, the documents are of a sensitive nature, and the degree of potential injury is high.” (emphasis added)

2019 (March) –Rep. Mark Walker (R-NC) announces the “Student-Athlete Equity Act”; bill would strip the NCAA of nonprofit status unless it provides name, image, and likeness (NIL) benefits; bill has bi-partisan, bi-racial sponsorship; NCAA pushes aggressively to beat back bill’s momentum; Walker tries to schedule a meeting with Mark Emmert but is rebuffed; Walker’s bill adds another external regulatory threat

2019  (May) – in response to SB 206 and the Walker bill, the NCAA forms the NCAA Board of Governors Federal and State Legislation Working Group to decide whether to continue its militant opposition to NIL compensation; the Working Group and NCAA Board of Governors lead stakeholders to believe that the NCAA will change its rules voluntarily to permit NIL compensation; Working Group’s NIL limitations make meaningful NIL compensation almost impossible; through the Working Group, the NCAA leads athletes, other stakeholders, and the public to believe it will voluntarily change its rules to permit name, image, and likeness compensation

2019 – in Johnson v NCAA, a group of lower-level Division I athletes sue their schools and the NCAA in federal court in Pennsylvania seeking hourly wage benefits under the Fair Labor Standards Act; to be eligible for FLSA benefits, one must be an employee; Johnson suit adds a new external regulatory threat to the NCAA and Power 5

2019 (May/June) – in response to concerns that the NCAA wasn’t acting aggressively enough to punish schools, coaches, and athletes in cases arising from the SDNY basketball prosecutions, NCAA executives make bold public statements on cases before a notice of allegations has been issued; Stan Wilcox, NCAA VP for regulatory Affairs said, “The main thing is that we’re up and ready. We’re moving forward and you’ll see consequences.”; President of Division I Governance Kevin Lennon said, “You’re likely to see notices of allegations going out to institutions that have violated NCAA rules.”; Wilcox and Lennon’s comments are inconsistent with rules and protocols prohibiting public comments on pending cases and suggest prejudgment that violations have occurred; statements reinforce NCAA’s long-standing practice of publicly promoting its integrity-based regulatory model in contravention of its own rules and regulatory authority to enhance the NCAA’s public image

2019 (August) – the administrative apparatus for the Independent Accountability Resolution Process is fully operational and includes a referral process that triggers IARP jurisdiction; almost immediately after the IARP becomes operational in August 2019, NCAA decision-makers and Power 5 conference leaders openly criticize the IARP as slow and inefficient; SEC Commissioner Greg Sankey is a vocal opponent of IARP; ultimately, only six cases (all basketball-related) are referred to the IARP

2019 (September 11/September 30) – CA NIL law (SB 206) passed by CA legislature and signed into law by Governor Gavin Newsome; SB 206 presents state legislatures as a new external regulatory threat to the NCAA; SB 206 has effective date of January 1, 2023; extended effective date intended to give the NCAA’s Working Group time to adopt voluntary NIL rules changes

2019 (October 23rd) – NCAA Working Group releases “interim report” on NIL; vague principles, few details; loaded with “guardrails”; must comply with “collegiate model”; these threshold limitations make it impossible for athletes to receive meaningful NIL compensation;  Working Group’s principles and guidance titled “PRINCIPLES AND ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS RELATED TO POTENTIAL NAME, IMAGE, AND LIKENESS MODIFICATIONS” (bold and full caps in original; italics added); Working Group justifies “guardrails” on the belief that “…the commercial value of a student-athlete’s name, image, or likeness may be derived largely through the student-athletes association with his or her school and/or participation in athletics.”; report identifies the need for national uniformity in NIL rulemaking but says nothing specifically about federal preemption

2019 – (October 29) -  NCAA Board of Governors reviews October 23 interim report and proclaims a desire to “modernize” NCAA rules consistent with the “collegiate model” through suggested “guardrails”; Board of Governors adopts Working Group’s language on “potential” modifications; mainstream media hail NCAA press release as actual NIL rules changes that permit NIL compensation; meeting minutes do not mention congressional engagement; NCAA Division I Student-Athlete Advisory Committee issues open letter on proposed NIL changes titled “We are the 100%”; SAAC signatories comprised substantially of white, non-revenue sport athletes; letter parrots NCAA/P5 talking points: “No one is talking about how proposals for name, image and likeness reform — both state and federal — will affect sports other than football and men’s basketball or a handful of elite student-athletes in other sports. No one is talking about what the proposals will do for limited resource institutions, historically black colleges and universities, or international students…[w]hile name, image and likeness compensation carry many benefits, there are a plethora of potential unintended consequences that will inevitably erupt unless regulations are put into place to prevent them. Some of those consequences include unfair recruiting and competitive advantages, difficulty monitoring compensation and ethics, inequitable treatment of female athletes, and exploitation of athletes by professional and commercial enterprises. With the potential loss of revenue to athletics departments, the biggest impact could be on scholarships for equivalency sports, which are predominately women’s teams.”; SAAC letter receives favorable national press coverage; letter used by NCAA to create narrative of consensus among college athletes; the NCAA-controlled SAAC is the only athlete group the NCAA recognizes; SAAC concerns in letter (see below) mirror those the NCAA will present to Congress beginning in February 2020

2019 (December) – under the guise of NIL compensation, the Power 5 and NCAA quietly begin formulating a strategy to seek a bill from Congress that eliminates all external regulatory threats; the NCAA and Power 5 seek (1) federal preemption of state athlete compensation laws to eliminate state legislatures from the college sports regulatory field, (2) antitrust immunity to eliminate federal courts from the regulatory field, and (3) a “no-employee” provision that would prevent athletes from being university employees as a matter of federal law that would prevent athlete's claims under federal labor laws; if the NCAA and Power 5 obtain these extraordinary protections and immunities, the NCAA would have unchallengeable regulatory and enforcement authority; this strategy was devised in a secret meeting completely outside the NCAA governance system (meeting notes in images below)

Note: For a detailed discussion of the Power 5’s secret strategies to achieve absolute regulatory authority, see “Power 5 Secret War” Tab in the Explore Menu

2020 (February) – the first wave of congressional hearings begins in the Senate through which the NCAA and Power 5 seek extraordinary federal protections and immunities; NCAA and Power 5 employ top lobbying firms; NCAA/Power 5 witnesses dominate witness lists; several states—including Florida (see June 12 and 18 entries)—pass NIL laws that go into effect on July 1st, 2021; this accelerates the NIL timeline from SB 206’s effective date of 2023

Note: For a detailed analysis and timeline of the NCAA/P5 congressional campaign including all congressional hearings, see the Congress Tab in the Explore Menu

2020 (March) – IARP accepts first referred case (University of Memphis; not part of SDNY prosecutions)

2020 – (May) – IARP accepts first referred SDNY case (NC State)

2020 (June 12) - FL legislature enacts NIL law; set to go into effect on July 1st, 2021; bill promotes amateurism; loaded with amateurism-based protective “guardrails” that are pitched as values-based and necessary to preserve the integrity of college sports; FL law accelerates Congressional timeline and creates a sense of manufactured urgency for federal legislation

2020 (June 18) FL Senator Marco Rubio introduces Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act that is a naked NCAA/P5 power grab; short bill gives NCAA antitrust immunity, preemption, and no employee status for athletes; NCAA lauds bill on its website; Rubio bill would nullify Florida NIL law passed just six days earlier; Rubio’s bill has no co-sponsors; the Rubio bill begins a three-and-a-half-year cycle of proposed federal legislation, much of it favorable to NCAA/Power 5 interests

2020 (mid-June) – Uniform Law Commission votes to move forward with uniform NIL legislation; Commission member and former University of Nebraska Harvey Perlman (co-author of Power 5 Autonomy memo in November 2013) issues statement to Committee expressing his “profound” opposition to NIL and the ULC’s NIL legislation; Perlman invokes divisive, racialized NCAA/Power 5 talking points to support his opposition; Perlman would become a dominant voice in Committee discussions

2020 (June 15th) – a group of athletes file a federal class action suit—House v NCAA—claiming NIL-related damages and injunctive relief; claims include broadcast NIL revenue; case set for trial January 2025; potential damages could exceed a billion dollars

2020 - (July 1st) - Senate hearing in Commerce Committee (“Exploring a Compensation Framework for Intercollegiate Athletics”); Chaired by Sen. Roger Wicker (R-MS); NCAA-friendly; Wicker opens by promoting preservation of status quo saying “first do no harm”; Wicker says he approaches NIL compensation and hearing “with abundance of caution and reluctance, even skepticism and trepidation; ranking member Maria Cantwell (D-WA) says she is “certainly one that sides with wanting to have amateur athleticism and to make sure we are keeping amateur athleticism, if anything I think we should be doing more as a committee in our oversight of the violations of that athleticism and amateurism that occur all the time”; SEC commissioner Greg Sankey testifies and offers panoply of anti-NIL, amateurism-based talking points; Sankey points to Florida NIL bill passed June 12th as accelerating timeline but does not mention the Rubio bill introduced on June 18th that would nullify the Florida NIL law; urgency on preemption because state laws set to go into effect July 2021; NCAA and P5 present their own bills; bills are discussed but not made public; SI publishes partial copy of NCAA bill; NCAA bill proposal contains no meaningful NIL benefits but has preemption, antitrust immunity, and no employee status for athletes; pro-athlete witness Prof. Dionne Koller (University of Baltimore Law School) offers comprehensive rebuttal to NCAA/Power 5 narratives

2020 (September 20th) – Rep. Anthony Gonzalez (R-OH) and Emmanuel Cleaver (D-MO) introduce” the “Student-Athlete Level Playing Field Act”; bill praised by NCAA; bill contains preemption, antitrust immunity, and no employee status for athletes

2020 (October 8th) - NCAA Division I Name, Image, and Likeness Legislative Solutions Group issues recommendations to D-I Council for NIL rules changes; recommendations were made in anticipation of annual NCAA convention in January 2021; NCAA Board of Governors had promised NIL rules changes for consideration and adoption at convention

2020 (October 15th) – the NCAA appeals the Alston case to the US Supreme Court; the NCAA seeks absolute judicially-created antitrust immunity

2020 (November 3rd) – General election; U.S. Senate hangs in the balance with GA special elections; possibility that the NCAA and Power 5 may lose their Republican advantage in the Senate

2020 (December) – SEC commissioner Greg Sankey sends letter to Division I Council laying out concerns over infractions and enforcement process suggesting process is in crisis; Sankey focuses criticism on the Independent Accountability Resolution Process and says new process is taking too long and is inefficient; infrastructure for IARP had only been in place 16 months; first case (Memphis) was not placed in the IARP process until March 2020; Sankey letter lays foundation for Sankey-led elimination of IARP

2020 (December 10th) – Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS) introduces “Collegiate Athlete and Compensation Rights Act”; amateurism-based; has broad federal preemption, antitrust immunity, and no employee status; scope of preemption is not limited to name, image, and likeness, and antitrust immunity is as broad as possible; Wicker bill would eliminate from the college sports regulatory field federal courts, federal administrative agencies (NLRB), state legislatures, and free markets; these three extraordinary federal protections and immunities are expressed in less than 175 words; bill would eliminate nearly all legal and regulatory pathways for athletes to protect their fundamental rights as Americans

2020 (December 16) – the Supreme Court accepts the Alston case for review; acceptance of case completely changes the NCAA/Power 5 chess board; through its request for broad-based judicially created antitrust immunity, NCAA has realistic chance of being able to impose its amateurism-based compensation limits—including NIL—without legal consequence

2020 (December 17) – Senators including Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) introduce the Athletes Bill of Rights; bill contains health and safety standards and would permit revenue sharing; bill would create a federal corporation as regulatory and enforcement authority; bill prohibits current or former NCAA and Power 5 insiders from sitting on federal corporation board; bill viewed as a civil rights-oriented counter-weight to NCAA-friendly proposals from Rubio, Wicker, and Gonzalez

2021 (January 5th) – GA special elections flip Senate from Republican to Democrat

2021 (January 8th, 9th) – NCAA abruptly ceases voluntary rulemaking on NIL; NCAA blames “pressure” from Makan Delharim, head of DOJ Antitrust Division; Mark Emmert and media create narrative that DOJ instructed the NCAA to stand down on voluntary rulemaking due to alleged antitrust concerns over NIL and transfer rules changes; Delharim would later (see June 24th, 2021 entry) dispute NCAA’s portrayal saying he did not interfere with NCAA’s voluntary rulemaking on NIL or transfers

2021 (January 11th/13th) – NCAA announces it is indefinitely suspending voluntary rulemaking on NIL/transfers; DI Council rules tabled; NCAA Board of Governors concurs; NCAA cites Justice Dept. pressure

2021 (February) – Division I Board of Directors creates the new Infractions Process Committee designed to set policy for infractions and enforcement; IPC has nine members and only five voting members; SEC Commissioner Greg Sankey is one of five voting members; IPC’s charge does not specifically mention IARP

2021 (February 24th) – Senator Jerry Moran (R-KS) introduces the “Amateur Athletes Protection and Compensation Act of 2021”; praised in media as “middle of the road” compromise; contains preemption, antitrust immunity, and no employee status; like the Wicker and Rubio bills, Moran’s bill would end athletes’ rights movement; bill has draconian credentialing reporting requirements targeted to athletes, agents, boosters and NIL companies; bill is identified in many NCAA/Power 5 lobbyists’ disclosure reports as a bill that NCAA/Power 5 are promoting through lobbying activity; federalized NIL market would be run by a federal corporation run by Power 5/NCAA insiders; federal corporation would have subpoena power to compel witnesses and documents; subpoenas could be issued by the federal corporation “at the request of a national amateur athletic association” (the NCAA)

2021 (June 9th) – with the July 1st state NIL law deadline approaching, the Senate Commerce Committee holds a hearing in which the NCAA and Power 5 ask for emergency preemption to nullify state NIL laws

2021 (June 21st) – U S Supreme Court issues a unanimous 9-0 decision in Alston rejecting the NCAA’s claim for judicially-created antitrust immunity; NCAA must comply with free competition laws under standard antitrust analyses; court openly calls into question the legitimacy of amateurism itself; case is blow to NCAA’s quest for unchallengeable regulatory authority

2021 (June 24th) – Makan Delharim, former head of the DOJ Antitrust Division says in a podcast interview that neither he nor the DOJ instructed the NCAA to abandon its voluntary rulemaking on NIL in January 2021; Delharim said the real reason the NCAA ceased voluntary rulemaking was that it received a “free shot in the goal” in its quest for antitrust immunity when the US Supreme Court agreed to hear the NCAA’s appeal in Alston on December 16th 2020; Delharim noted that if the NCAA had received judicially-created antitrust immunity in Alston, it would have been granted the legal the authority to do nothing on NIL

2021 (June 30) – seven hours and forty minutes before the July 1st NIL deadline, the NCAA announces its “Interim Policy” on NIL; Policy is temporary until one of two conditions are met: (1) the NCAA changes its NIL rules, or (2) the NCAA obtains protective federal legislation from Congress; NCAA suspends its enforcement of certain NCAA NIL rules, but reatains prohibitions on pay-for-play and recruiting inducements; Interim Policy marks the first time in NCAA history that it has chosen not to enforce an amateurism-based compensation limit; limited free market principles operate in new NIL market; NCAA and Power 5 quickly begin criticizing NIL market as the “Wild West,” and “chaos”; they claim NIL deals are disguises for pay-for-play and recruiting inducements; refusal to enforce leads to regulatory vacuum; NCAA and Power 5 claim that NIL enforcement will result in additional potential lawsuits by athletes; NCAA and Power 5 use “Wild West” and chaos themes in Congressional campaign for protective federal legislation that would allow NCAA/P5 to regulate college sports—including NIL—without legal accountability

2021 (July) – the Universities of Texas and Oklahoma announce they are leaving the Big 12 for the SEC; this begins football-driven “conference realignment 2.0”

2021 (August) – in the aftermath of Alston and the NCAA’s failed congressional campaign, the NCAA forms the Constitution Committee under the direction of Board of Governors member Robert Gates, the former Director of the CIA; Gates observes that the NCAA is in a fight for relevance and must align its authorities with its responsibilities; the Committee is tasked to rewrite the NCAA Constitution to transform NCAA governance

2021 (August) – NCAA Committee on Infractions releases its decision in the Baylor football scandal involving violence against women by Baylor football players and a cover-up by the university; despite finding widespread institutional failures up and down the chain of command, the COI concludes that it has no jurisdiction to impose penalties because no NCAA rules address the conduct at issue; case highlights the chasm between the NCAA’s claimed commitment to athlete (and community) safety, well-being, and gender equity and the failure to adopt legislation that makes those principles enforceable

2021 (September) – the National Labor Relations Board’s top lawyer, Jennifer Abruzzo issues a policy memo saying that certain college athletes have been “misclassified” as non-employees; Abruzzo contends that the use of the label “student-athlete” to mean the opposite of employee is an independent violation of the National Labor Relations Act; memo also suggests the NCAA could be covered by NLRA as a “joint employer” with member institutions

2021 (September 30) – House Commerce Subcommittee holds hearing titled “A Level Playing Field: College Athletes Rights to Their Name, Image, and Likeness”; Gus Bilirakis (R-FL) holds up letter from ACC Student Athlete Advisory Committee as authoritative consensus on what athletes want; ACC letter aligns with NCAA/Power 5 goals and talking points; ACC Letter is dated 9/23 and signed by 16 athletes; 2 other athletes identified in letter as “primary contacts”; of the 18 ACC athletes, 15 (83%) are non-revenue athletes and 15 (83%) are white

2021 (October) – NCAA D-I Board of Directors announces the formation of the D-I BOD’s Transformation Committee tasked to implement D-I changes consistent with, and in anticipation of, new constitution; SEC commissioner Greg Sankey is co-chair with Ohio University athletics director Julie Cromer; roster comprised of NCAA insiders; majority P5 members; no current or recently graduated athlete on Committee; Transformation Committee aligns its work with the Constitution Committee

2021 (November) – House member David Kustoff (R-TN) introduces a bipartisan bill targeting NCAA enforcement; bill titled the “NCAA Accountability Act of 2021”; the Act would require the NCAA to provide due process protection, transparency, fair investigations, and efficient outcomes; the NCAA’s infractions and enforcement process would be placed under the supervision of the Department of Justice, with severe penalties for violations; Kustoff press release says, "The NCAA's infractions process is systematically flawed. The NCAA writes the rules, enforces the rules, and punishes universities at will. Essentially, the NCAA acts as the prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner over college athletics. This unchecked authority and exploitative behavior has ruined careers, harmed the U.S. education system, and caused great economic damage to local communities…the NCAA offers its members little due process protections. Its rules are irregularly enforced, and its investigations lack established procedures.” (emphasis added)

2022 (January) – the NCAA adopts a new Constitution designed to place more regulatory and governance authorities in the hands of the Divisions; Division I would have the authority to create its own infractions and enforcement apparatus; this new enforcement authority is similar to what the Power 5 sought through Autonomy in 2013-2014; new Constitution reduces the Board of Governors from twenty-one voting members to nine (including for the first time a conference commissioner); authorities of NCAA president curtailed; Constitution essentially formalizes the Power 5 football’s slow-rolling takeover of NCAA governance

2022 (February) – at its first substantive meeting, the Greg Sankey-led Transformation Committee emphasizes the importance of recommendations from the Infractions Process Committee (Sankey is one of five voting members on the IPC); Transformation Committee minutes show that it was concerned with its public image/messaging; Transformation Committee retains the NCAA’s DC public relations firm, Bully Pulpit Interactive to produce a “comprehensive communications plan”; the integration of the Infractions Process Committee’s work with the Transformation Committee’s work on public messaging highlights emphasizing infractions/enforcement messaging and aligns with prior messaging campaigns (e.g., Penn State scandal, SDNY basketball “scandal”)

2022 (February) -  National College Players’ Association (NCPA) files a “misclassification” charge with NLRB against USC, Pac-12, and NCAA; alleges violation of NLRA; alleges “joint employer” status for Pac-12 and NCAA; NLRB charge adds further pressure to NCAA/P5 from external regulators

2022 (February) - CA Senator Steve Bradford introduces “California Race and Gender Equity Act”; bill provides for revenue-sharing in sports that have net revenue; money would be put into trust fund each year; athletes could receive distributions only after completing their degree requirements; Bradford bill adds additional pressure to NCAA and Power 5 as an external regulatory threat; NCAA and California schools aggressively oppose bill which would die in the CA Senate’s Appropriations Committee; Bradford blames “fears, disinformation” and “fear-mongering” by Power 5 schools in CA

2022 (March) – citing unfair infractions and enforcement processes, Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) and Cory Booker (D-NJ) introduce the Senate version of the NCAA Accountability Act; bill is similar to David Kustoff’s 2021 bill; Blackburn press release says in part, “The NCAA has a well-established history of back room deliberations that produce unfair punishments for athletes, coaches, and universities.”; Booker says, “The NCAA has nearly absolute authority to investigate and punish member institutions and athletes who are accused of violating the Association’s rules. The process currently in place - where decisions are made behind closed doors, where investigations drag on for years, and where accused parties aren’t given adequate notice of their supposed violations - has gone on far too long.”

2022 (March) – Mid-American Conference announces it has signed a deal with Genius Sports (see 2018 entry on NCAA deal with Genius) for data collection and potential resale to sports books and casinos; terms not disclosed

2022 (April) – NCAA President Mark Emmert announces his retirement

2022 (April) – NCAA Interpretations Committee rules that Mid-American Conference’s deal with Genius Sports does not violate NCAA anti-gambling rules and policies; ruling is not published and receives scant attention in the media; ruling opens the door for Power 5 conferences to exploit the sports gambling market

2022 (June) – UCLA and USC announce they are leaving the Pac-12 for the Big Ten (second wave of conference realignment)

2022 (August 3rd) – Sens. Booker and Blumenthal reintroduce “Athletes Bill of Rights”; sponsors remove revenue sharing provisions contained in the original bill; revenue sharing was a key component of the original Athletes Bill of Rights’ civil rights focus; new bill marks movement by Booker and Blumenthal towards NCAA/Power 5 bills and away from civil rights

2022 (August 17/August 31) - through recommendations from the Greg Sankey-led Infractions Process Committee, the NCAA D-I Board of Directors eliminates the IARP

2022 (December) – NCAA hires former Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker as NCAA President; Baker’s hire viewed as a boost to the NCAA’s campaign in Congress for preemption, antitrust immunity, and no-employee status for athletes

2023 (January 3rd) – Transformation Committee releases its Final Report; very little transformation; recommendations offer only modest enhancements of existing athlete benefits; identifies for the first time the “Holistic Student Athlete Model” as a term of art; report and co-chairs’ public comments emphasize “student-athlete” input in process but not a single current or recently graduated athlete was on the Committee; Report takes “athlete benefits” already available to Power 5 through Autonomy legislation authorities (2014) and applies those benefits to the rest of Division I (ex., out-of-pocket medical coverage for athletically-related injuries for two years post-eligibility; degree completion programs); Committee’s Final report does not align with actual work of Committee as expressed in the Committee’s meeting minutes

2023 (February) - Third Circuit hears oral argument in Johnson v NCAA case on question of whether athletes can be employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act; panel appears uncomfortable with NCAA’s amateurism-based justifications for its business model and arguments against employee status

2023 (March 28th) – Five ACC Student Athlete Advisory Committee members send a letter on ACC/SAAC letterhead to the House Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Innovation, Data, and Commerce suggesting they are speaking for all 10,000 ACC athletes; ACC letter aligns with congressional goals of NCAA and Power 5; letter purports to speak for all 10,000 ACC athletes

2023 (March 29th) - Innovation, Data, and Commerce Subcommittee chaired by Rep. Gus Bilirakis (R-FL) holds hearing; six witnesses testify; five are pro-Power 5/NCAA, only one athlete advocate; Power 5/NCAA-friendly witnesses flood the hearing with talking points aligned with an NCAA Government Relations “ALERT” memo sent the day before to all NCAA stakeholders providing talking points on Congressional goals; substance of witness testimony has little to do with NIL; many Subcommittee members demonstrate lack of understanding of issues; Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-SC) holds up the letter from ACC athletes as the consensus view on what athletes want and the need for protective federal legislation

2023 (April 4th) - Hubbard v NCAA federal class-action antitrust lawsuit filed against NCAA and Power 5 for “back” Alston education benefits; athletes seek damages and injunctive relief; suit filed in Northern District of California before Judge Claudia Wilken, who heard O’Babbon and Alston suits; athletes jointly represented by Steve Berman and Jeffrey Kessler who teamed up in Alston and House; Hubbard classified as a “related case” case with House; Hubbard scheduling has case moving along the same track as House and will use evidence from House

2023 - several states (ex., Texas, Oklahoma) pass or amend laws that would limit the NCAA’s regulatory and enforcement jurisdiction on NIL-related issues; Texas bill (images below) also immunizes schools in Texas from liability for NIL and makes NIL contracts immune from public records requests; Texas bill directly challenges NCAA regulatory/enforcement authority; similar strategy to the 1990s due process bills in Nevada and Florida (see entry above for 1993)

2023 – NCAA and Power 5 aggressively seek protective federal legislation and lobby stakeholders to promote the NCAA/Power 5 legislative agenda; Power 5 commissioners, athletics directors, and high-profile coaches make repeated appearances in DC to meet with legislators; a slew of new bills are proposed (ex,. Tuberville/Manchin, Cruz, Bilirakis, Blumenthal/Booker/Moran) that would directly or indirectly (through a federal corporation or new commission) grant the NCAA (or NCAA/conference insiders) expansive regulatory and enforcement powers (see Cruz and Tuberville-Manchin examples below); Booker/Blumenthal/Moran bill would establish a federal corporation comprised in part of NCAA/Power 5 insiders; unlike the Booker-Blumenthal Athletes Bill of Rights from 2020 (see entry for December 10 2020) bill does not prohibit NCAA/Power 5 insiders (current of former) from sitting on federal corporation board; bill grants NCAA subpoena power

2023 (June 12) – as part of the NCAA/Power 5 blitz on Washington, the NCAA Division I Student Athlete Advisory Committee Chair sends a letter to 12 Senate and House members purporting to speak for all 190,000 Division I athletes; no other members of the national Division I SAAC sign the letter; SAAC Chair is former baseball player and current graduate assistant coach at St. Bonaventure University; letter asks for federal legislation that preempts state laws that conflict with NCAA amateurism-based compensation limits, antitrust immunity, and a prohibition on athletes being deemed employees of their university; recipients of the letter are Senate and House committee chairs and ranking members on commerce, judiciary, and labor committees; commerce has jurisdiction over sports matters and could confer preemption; judiciary has jurisdiction over antitrust matters and could bless antitrust immunity; labor committees could confer no-employee status; letter is another example of the NCAA co-opting the athlete voice and creating the false impression of consensus among athletes; letter presented as original work product of SAAC Chair

2023 (July 20th) – Sens. Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Cory Booker (D-NJ), and Jerry Moran (R-KS) release discussion draft bill “College Athletes Protection and Compensation Act of 2023”; bill draws substantially from Moran’s 2021 bill “Amateur College Athletes Protection and Compensation Act of 2021” (see February 24, 2021 entry); also includes portions of Booker/Blumenthal “College Athletes Bill of Rights” (see 12/17/2020 and 8/3/22 entries); CAPCA is built around NIL uniformity, not civil rights; CAPCA creates federal corporation that could permit NCAA/P5 insiders to control the Board of Directors; bill grants NCAA indirect subpoena power for investigations; “benefits” in bill include several (one-time transfer, out-of-pocket medical expenses, scholarship protection, limited degree completion program, and financial literacy and financial skills program) that already exist for Power 5 schools through Autonomy legislation; medical benefits are means tested and would apply almost exclusively to the Power 5; bill includes health and safety standards, but penalties for violations are modest; bill contains preemption and provision that its terms cannot create federal or state liability for institutions prior to bill’s enactment; does not address athlete employee status; bill marks substantial movement for Blumenthal and Booker towards the NCAA/Power 5 position and away from the Athletes Bill of Rights civil rights focus

2023 (July 21) – Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) introduces discussion draft bill (untitled) that would grant the NCAA broad authority to act as the regulatory and enforcement entity in college sports; Cruz bill contains sweeping preemption, antitrust immunity, and no employee status for athletes provisions; authorities extend far beyond NIL; Cruz is ranking member of the Senate Commerce Committee

2023 (July 26) – Senators Tommy Tuberville (R-AL) and Joe Manchin (D-WV) introduce bill titled “Protecting Athletes, Schools, and Sports Act of 2023”: bill grants NCAA broad regulatory and enforcement oversight

2023 (July - August) – conference realignment decimates the Pac-12 conference; in a football revenue-driven frenzy, the Universities of Oregon and Washington leave the Pac-12 for the Big Ten and Colorado, Arizona, Arizona State, and Utah leave the Pac-12 for the Big 12; third wave of conference realignment 2.0

2023 (September 13) – Dartmouth men’s basketball team files petition with the NLRB seeking employee status and ability to unionize

2023 (September) – Stanford, California-Berkeley, and SMU announce they are joining the ACC

2023 (September) – Rep. David Kustoff (R-TN) reintroduces infractions and enforcement bill under title “NCAA Accountability Act of 2023”

2023 (October 17th) – the Senate Judiciary Committee holds a hearing titled “Name, Image, and Likeness, and the Future of College Sports”; seven witnesses: (Charlie Baker [NCAA President], Tony Petitti [Big Ten Commissioner], Jill Bodensteiner [athletics director Saint Joseph’s University], Jack Swarbrick [athletics director Notre Dame], Trinity Thomas [former college gymnast], Walker Jones [NIL collective director], Ramogi Huma [athletes’ rights advocate]); 6-1 ratio of NCAA/P5 witnesses to athlete witness; Baker, Petitti, Bodensteiner, and Swarbrick all argue for preemption, antitrust immunity, and no employee status for athletes; Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) makes crucial observation that no regulatory model will be effective unless rules supporting the regulation are enforced. Blumenthal advocated for a truly independent enforcement regime(through a federal corporation, commission, or agency) in any federal sports legislation; Blumenthal’s observation was made in the context of a complete lack of enforcement of NIL restrictions (pay-for-play and recruiting inducements) by the NCAA and states that have passed NIL laws; Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) asks each witness who should be in charge of regulation and enforcement; Baker, Petitti, Swarbrick, and Bodensteiner say NCAA should be in charge; Cruz’s preface to his question omits the fact that under his bill, the federal government would provide extraordinary federal protections and immunities to the NCAA that would make their regulatory authority unchallengeable; Cruz continues with a question on whether athletes should be employees of their university; six of the seven witnesses say “no”

2023 (November 1st) - at the behest of Power 5 conference commissioners, 28 Division I conferences form the lobbying organization “Coalition for the Future of College Athletics” (CFCA) to lobby stakeholders to support legislation that would end the athletes’ rights movement; CFCA’s “Principles” are disguised requests for federal preemption of state laws regulating college sports, antitrust immunity, and non-employment status for athletes; CFCA’s; website has an auto-email function where a user types in identifying information and it is automatically sent to that person’s congressional representatives; source of CFCA’s funding not disclosed; unclear whether athlete revenue subsidizes; CFCA advertising appears on scoreboards at Power 5 football games

2023 (November 3rd) - in the House v NCAA NIL case, Judge Wilken issues an order granting the athletes’ motion to certify the damages class; this is a crucial ruling that permits the case to go forward on damages; order provides a framework for “Broadcast NIL” (through a group licensing approach), “video NIL,” and “third-party” NIL compensation to several “subclasses” of athletes: (1) Power 5 football and men’s basketball scholarship athletes (2) Power 5 women’s basketball athletes, and (3) “Additional Sports Class” (Division I nonrevenue athletes); allocations would be weighted according to the economic value of subclasses and paid in equal shares to members of each subclass; the framework does yet assign specific dollar amounts; payments would be made by conferences, not individual schools which minimizes Title IX implications because the Power 5 do not receive federal education funds and likely would not be responsible under Title IX; total damage estimates exceed $1 billion; under federal antitrust laws, an award of damages is automatically tripled

2023 (November 17th) - in House case, NCAA files a Petition for immediate (“interlocutory) Ninth Circuit review of Judge Wilksn’s November 3rd order certifying the damages class; NCAA seeks to have the order reversed

2023 (December 1st) - female athletes at the University of Oregon file a class-action Title IX lawsuit—Schroeder v NCAA—against the University, claiming multiple violations of Title IX; the suit targets Oregon’s NIL collective, its connection to the University, and unequal NIL payments; athletes co-represented by law firm Bailey & Glasser, the same law firm that represents the NCAA in a transfer-related antitrust suit filed on December 7th, 2023 by seven states (see December 7th, 2023 entry)

2023 (December 3rd) - “Power 4” conference commissioners Greg Sankey (SEC), Tony Petitti (Big Ten), Brett Yormark (Big 12), and Jim Phillips (ACC) go to Washington to lobby congressional leaders for protective federal legislation; commissioners meet with Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and House member Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) among others; all Power 4 conferences have lobbying firm Marshall and Popp working for them; Hazen Marshall is former key aid to McConnell; commissioners sit for brief CNN interview and claim that failure to obtain federal protections and immunities would result in the fatal collapse of college sports

2023 (December 5th) - NCAA President releases a letter to Division I committee members suggesting the creation of a new Division for top-tier, “highest resource” schools; these schools could invest at least $30,000 per year (for at least half of the school’s eligible athletes) into an “enhanced educational trust fund” for distribution to athletes consistent with Title IX; the letter also suggests that schools may be able to pay athletes directly for their NIL through group licensing deals (similar in theory to the remedy athletes seek in the House lawsuit); the letter is viewed as a ground-breaking shift in NCAA philosophy and policy on amateurism-based compensation limits; Baker did not address the timing of the letter; subsequent events suggest the NCAA and Power 5 needed to show Congress they were capable of making menaingful voluntary changes before receiving protections from Congress (see January 13th entry below); attorneys for athletes in the Carter suit filed on December 7th (see below) incorporate Baker’s letter into their complaint suggesting it is an admission that the NCAA has abandoned its amateurism-based compensation limits; notably, the letter says the new benefits “provides an operating model the NCAA and its member institutions can incorporate into ongoing discussions with Congress about the future of college sports”; Greg Sankey suggests he was not aware of the letter and expresses displeasure with Baker’s alleged exclusiion of stakeholders (December 7th entry below)

2023 (December 7th) - Carter v NCAA federal class-action antitrust lawsuit filed against NCAA and Power 5 challenging all NCAA amateurism-based compensation limits; suit is identical in purpose to Jenkins (2014 - 2021; consolidated into Alston); athletes seek damages and injunctive relief; suit filed in Northern District of California and assigned to Chief Judge Richard Seeborg rather then Claudia Wilken; athletes jointly represented by Steve Berman and Jeffrey Kessler who teamed up in Alston, House, and Hubbard; complaint identifies Charlie Baker’s December 5th letter as evidence that the NCAA has abandoned its commitment to amateurism-based compensation limits

2023 (December 7th) - states of Ohio, Colorado, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia file federal class-action antitrust lawsuit in West Virginia against the NCAA seeking to strike down the NCAA’s transfer restrictions (one-time per rules revised in April 2021) and the NCAA’s “Restitution Rule” (that effectively prevents athletes from seeking temporary legal relief from courts regarding NCAA eligibility decisions); States and NCAA reach a stipulation on athlete eligibility; NCAA agrees not to declare athletes ineligible who were denied a second transfer via NCAA waiver; NCAA’s co-counsel is Baily and Glasser, the same firm that represents female athletes in Schroeder case (see entry for December 1st, 2023)

2023 (December 19th) - in lead-up to the NCAA annual convention in January, Baker issues “A letter to student-athletes from Charlie Baker” describing potential changes to athlete benefits consistent with his December 5th letter; Baker portrays new benefits as a “working document” and “not set in stone”; Baker emphasizes that the NCAA cannot make suggested changes without help from Congress “to prevent athletes from being considered employees…and must have the authority to make nationwide rules without endless legal challenges,” a clear call for antitrust immunity; Baker also asks athletes to join in the NCAA lobbying campaign, saying “I am proud that so many student-athletes are joining us in our work with Congress. Thank you! We will continue to need your voice in Washington D.C.”

2023 - December 21st - Atlantic Coast Conference files preemptive lawsuit in NC state court against the University of Florida State Board of Trustees seeking a declaration affirming the enforceability of the ACC’s grant of rights provision that severely penalizes schools who leave the ACC for another conference; ACC also makes breach of contract claims

2023 (December 22nd) - Florida State Board of Trustees files lawsuit in Florida state court against the ACC seeking a declaration that the ACC’s grant of rights provision is unenforceable; FSU makes breach of contract and state antitrust claims

2024 (January 8th/11th) - Florida House member Gus Bilirakis (R-FL) rereleases a discussion draft of the “Fairness, Accountability, and Integrity in Representation of College Sports Act” (FAIR Act); bill contains broad preemption, antitrust immunity, and no employee provisions that would end the athletes’ rights movement; bill goes further prior draft to protect NCAA/Power 5; federal powers would reside in a private nonprofit entity governed by a board comprised largely of NCAA, Power 5 and other institutional stakeholders; NCAA President would be a permanent nonvoting member of the board; on January 11th, Bilirakis—as Chair of the House Subcommittee on Innovation, Data, and Commerce—issues a press release in which Subcommittee member Debbie Dingell (D-MI) and Senator Ben Ray Lujan (D-NM) show support for the bill; Bilirakis pitches bill as bipartisan; in the third quarter of 2023, Brownstein Hyatt’s (NCAA lobbying firm) lobbying disclosures show that it added lobbyist Gregory Sunstrum to its NCAA lobbying team; Sunstrom served as Dingell’s former chief of staff, deputy chief of staff, and legislative aid

2024 (January 9th - 13th) - NCAA holds its annual convention in Phoenix; 3000 attendees across all three Divisions; NCAA pays expenses from March Madness revenue and the labors of elite Division I men’s basketball players; according to the NCAA’s 2021 Form 990 nonprofit tax return, the NCAA spent nearly six million dollars on “conferences, conventions, and meetings”; it spent $140 million on “occupancy” and “travel”; ESPN’s Holly Rowe makes welcoming address and emphasizes the new ESPN contract with the NCAA with an emphasis on gender equity; themes at the convention include (1) protective federal legislation; (2)increasing NCAA revenues; (3) Title IX compliance (4) sports betting guardrails; (5) mental health (6) NCAA legislation to move forward Baker’s D-I proposal; Charlie Baker delivers his state of the association speech which included an open appeal for protective federal legislation; NCAA holds “Featured Session” titled “Safeguarding the Future of College Sports: Congressional Advocacy Tools for Campuses and Conferences”; session is an explicit lobbying effort for protective federal legislation including antitrust immunity; lobbying effort directed to stakeholders, not Congress; session led by Robert Gibbs, former Press Secretary under President Barack Obama; Gibbs is a partner with Bully Pulpit International (f/k/a Bully Pulpit Interactive Inc.); Bully Pulpit is a prominent public relations firm based in Washington D.C. that has worked for the NCAA since 2015 to shape the NCAA’s public image; since 2015, the NCAA has paid Bully Pulpit at least $40 million

2023 (January 12th) - NCAA releases infractions decision involving a Florida State assistant football coach’s facilitation of a meeting between a prospect in the transfer portal and a booster who runs an FSU NIL collective; the case was adjudicated through the “Negotiated Resolution” Process that is collaborative; case involved “impermissible recruiting activities” and “provision of false or misleading information” by the assistant coach; these violations were charged as “Level II” (less severe than “Level I”) violations; prior precedent typically resulted in false/misleading information cases being charged as Level I violations; although case arose in the NIL context, the actual conduct identified in the decision related to impermissible recruiting contacts and lying to the NCAA; NCAA website characterizes the case as “NIL-related Recruiting Violation”; penalties include a requirement that FSU “disassociate” the collective for one year; media portrays the decision as a significant move by the NCAA that signals it is willing to pursue NIL cases after two-and-a-half years of inaction; media overstates the decision characterizing it as involving a of violation NCAA NIL rules prohibiting the use of NIL as a recruiting inducement; timing and coverage of the FSU decision aligns with the NCAA’s public relations and congressional strategies to prove to Congress and the public that it is willing enforce its own rules and address its own problems (see next entry)

2024 (January 13th) - Baylor University President and NCAA Board of Governors Chair Linda Livingstone gives an interview in which she addresses Charlie Baker’s December 5th, 2023 proposal and its connection to the NCAA’s congressional campaign; Livingstone says Baker’s proposal was the product of collaboration with the NCAA Board of Governors and the Division I Board of Directors; Livingstone’s characterization appears to be inconsistent with SEC commissioner Greg Sankey’s suggestion that Baker’s letter took key stakeholders by surprise; Sankey holds a key BOG position on its Subcommittee on Congressional Engagement and Action; University of Georgia President and Division I Board of Directors Chair Jere Morehead also sits on the BOG and works closely with Sankey; Livingstone also provides insight into a possible motive for Baker’s new proposal, saying that Congress members wanted the NCAA to show that it could fix as many of its own issues as possible as a precondition to any protective federal legislation; Livingstone also says she is “cautiously optimistic” that Congress will act, but believes any action must in place in the spring or summer before focus turns to the November general election

2024 (January 18th) - the United States (primarily through the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division), the District of Columbia, and the states of Minnesota, Mississippi, and Virginia intervene in the Ohio et al. v NCAA federal antitrust suit in West Virginia challenging the NCAA’s transfer rules; intervention by the United States is significant and places additional pressure on NCAA; it also raises the question of whether it will intervene in other college sports antitrust cases; the United States intervened late in the Alston litigation just weeks before oral argument in the U.S. Supreme Court but has not intervened in other antitrust cases filed by athletes challenging NCAA compensation limits and eligibility rules; plaintiff’s file an amended complaint

2024 (January 18th) - in House v NCAA, the Ninth Circuit denies the NCAA’s Petition for an interlocutory appeal of Judge Wilken’s Order certifying the damages class; the case will go forward on damages; the ruling places pressure on NCAA and Power 5 to decide whether to attempt to settle the case, in whole or part

2024 (January 18th) - House Subcommittee on Data, Innovation, and Commerce, chaired by Rep. Gus Bilirakis (R-FL), holds a hearing titled “NIL Playbook: Proposal to Protect Student Athletes’ Dealmaking Rights”; six witnesses testify; four are pro-Power 5/NCAA; two advocate against protective federal legislation; although the hearing title suggested an emphasis on NIL, NCAA/Power 5 witnesses and sympathetic committee members flood the hearing with dire predictions of harm if athletes are deemed employees of their university; critics of an employment model invoke Title IX, Olympic development, and nonrevenue sports interests; for the first time in four years through eleven hearings and fifty-eight witness slots, a current Power 5 football athlete—Chase Griffin of UCLA—testifies; Griffin offers a persuasive, comprehensive free market-based rebuttal to the limitations in Bilirakis’s bill and the broader question of the necessity for government regulation in college sports

2024 (January 31st) - the states of Tennessee and Virginia file a federal antitrust suit against the NCAA challenging the NCAA’s NIL rules and policies; the suit arises from an NCAA infractions and enforcement case against the University of Tennessee involving its NIL collective Sprye Sports; the NCAA alleges the collective made promises and payments to athletes as recruiting inducements; Tennessee Attorney General Jonathan Skrmetti issues press release saying in part, “The NCAA’s restraints on prospective students’ ability to meaningfully negotiate NIL deals violate federal antitrust law. Only Congress has the power to impose such limits.”; suit seeks 91) an order declaring the NCAA’s NIL-recruitment ban violates section 1 of the Sherman Act and (2) a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief “barring the NCAA from enforcing its NIL-recruiting ban or taking any other action to prevent prospective college athletes and transfer candidates from engaging in meaningful NIL discussions prior to enrollment, including under the NCAA’s Rule of Restitution”

2024 (February 2nd) - SEC and Big Ten announce a partnership to collaborate on big-picture issues in college sports, including pending litigation (particularly House) and the possibility of settling cases, governance proposals, and state laws; partnership comes to be known as the “SEC-Big Ten Advisory Group” comprised of key conference stakeholders and decision-makers; Big 12 and ACC not consulted before Advisory Group was created; move generates speculation that the SEC and Big Ten are planning a departure from the NCAA; SEC commissioner Greg Sankey and Big Ten commissioner Tony Petitti say that is not their intention; Advisory Group could be influential in structure and payout system in expanded CFP; in response to why stakeholders outside the SEC and Big Ten are excluded, Sankey says, “Big problems are not solved in big rooms filled with people. You have to narrow the focus a bit. There may be raised eyebrows. We certainly called in advance to communicate what was going to be announced rather than do it in the shadows and have someone report on it. You might as well put things out there.”

2024 (February 5) - in the Dartmouth NLRB unionization case, the NLRB Regional Director rules in favor of the men’s basketball players and issues her Decision and Direction of Election; applying the common law test for employee status, the Regional Director finds the athletes are employees within the meaning of the NLRA.

2024 (February 7th) - House members Alma Adams (D-NC), Suzanne Bonamici (D-OR), and Lori Trahan (D-MA) re-introduce the Fair Play for Women Act that would hold the NCAA accountable under Title IX and provide athletes a private right of action; the bill makes Title IX applicable to the NCAA, which cures a defect in Title IX coverage from the 1999 U.S. Supreme Court decision in NCAA v Smith in which the Court held that Title IX did not apply to the NCAA because it does not receive federal education money; Senators Chris Murphy (D-CT) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) introduce a companion bill in the Senate

2024 (February 23rd) - in the Tennessee NIL suit, U.S. District Court Judge Clifton Corker (E.D. TN) issues a preliminary injunction against the NCAA; under the order, the NCAA is “ restrained and enjoined from enforcing the NCAA Interim NIL Policy, the NCAA Bylaws, or any other authority to the extent such authority prohibits student-athletes from negotiating compensation for NIL with any third-party entity, including but not limited to boosters or a collective of boosters, until a full and final decision on the merits in the instant action.”; the order also prevents the NCAA from enforcing its “Restitution Rule” (NCAA Bylaw 12.11.4.2) that allows it to punish athletes and schools if they seek judicial relief and the case is ultimately resolved in the NCAA’s favor; the ruling permits collectives associated with a particular school to discuss potential NIL deals with high school and transfer portal prospects

2024 (March 5th) - Dartmouth men’s basketball team votes 13 - 2 to form a union; Dartmouth immediately appeals to the NLRB’s top board; NCAA issues statement restating NCAA opposition to employee status for athletes and the need for federal legislation:

“The NCAA is making changes to deliver more benefits to student-athletes, including guaranteed health care and guaranteed scholarships, but the NCAA and student-athlete leadership from all three divisions agree college athletes should not be forced into an employment model. The Association believes change in college sports is long overdue and is pursuing significant reforms. However, there are some issues the NCAA cannot address alone, and the Association looks forward to working with Congress to make needed changes in the best interest of all student-athletes.”

2024 (March 5th) - immediately after the Dartmouth vote, the House Committee on Education & the Workforce’s Subcommittees on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions and Higher Education and Workforce Development announce a March 12th hearing is ironically titled "Safeguarding Student-Athletes From NLRB Misclassification"; the hearing is identical in context and purpose to a reactionary hearing in the same committee on May 8, 2014 after the regional director issued his decision in the Northwestern unionization case finding that Northwestern football players were employees and entitled to vote on whether to form a union; the 2014 hearing was likewise ironically titled “Student-Athlete Unions”

2024 (March 12th) - House Committee on Education & the Workforce’s Subcommittees on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions and Higher Education and Workforce Development hold a hearing ironically titled "Safeguarding Student-Athletes From NLRB Misclassification"; hearing is a frontal attack on athletes as employees, the NLRB’s policy on athletes as employees, and the NLRB’s Dartmouth decision; former NLRB national board member Mark Gaston Pearce (below) educates the Committee on the history of the term “student-athlete”